Impeachment in Latin America and the removal of Dina Boluarte from office in Peru

Introduction

In Latin America, the presidential removal mechanism (impeachment, vacancy, or political trial) has become established as an institutional tool for resolving governance crises. However, its frequent use reflects the fragility of presidential systems in the region.

The most recent case was the impeachment of Dina Boluarte in Peru (October 10, 2025). The president was removed from office by the country's Congress after the unicameral parliament, with 118 votes in favor, approved the vacancy due to "permanent moral incapacity" (BBC, 2025). The first motion focused on the alleged corruption crimes in the "Rolex Case"; the second, on the crisis of citizen insecurity; the third, on the lack of leadership in the face of organized crime; and the fourth, on the alleged dereliction of duty and lack of transparency in her official activities (Congress of the Republic of Peru, 2025). This was compounded by her plummeting public approval rating, which fell to 3%, while her disapproval rating soared to 93% in September 2025 (IEP, 2025). This combination of insecurity, governance crisis, corruption, and unfavorable public opinion made it easier for Congress to vote in favor of his removal with more than 122 votes.

Source: Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP). (2025, July). Opinion Report: July 2025 (full report)

However, this episode in Peru is part of a much broader regional trend that has characterized Latin America in recent decades. In countries such as Brazil, Paraguay, Honduras, Ecuador, and Bolivia, impeachment has been used as an institutional mechanism to address presidential crises when the executive branch loses social legitimacy or parliamentary support.

This Policy Brief will demonstrate how Latin American cases show that the figure of presidential impeachment —although conceived as a last resort in the face of violations of the Constitution or the law by heads of state— has become a recurring practice in the region and a political instrument to resolve governance crises.

In this sense, impeachment in Latin America, far from being merely a mechanism for safeguarding the rule of law, reveals structural flaws in political systems: unbalanced checks and balances between executive and legislative branches, and democratic stability under constant threat. This phenomenon aligns with Sartori's (1997) warning that a constitutionalism incapable of anticipating the real effects of its provisions could generate vacuums like the Peruvian "presidential vacancy," which, instead of resolving conflicts, ends up deepening institutional instability and paralyzing the system.

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Concepts

Presidential vacancy : According to Article 113, paragraph 2, of the Peruvian Constitution of 1993, it is Congress that declares the permanent moral incapacity of the president, which automatically produces the vacancy of the office (Atienza & Ruiz Manero, 1991, p. 107).

Permanent moral incapacity : The figure of permanent moral incapacity in Peru constitutes a clause of open content, which has gone from meaning mental incapacity to becoming a political judgment of Congress on the conduct of the president” (López, 2020, p. 52).

Crisis of governance: This is the situation in which a political system loses the capacity to make legitimate and effective decisions, due to institutional paralysis, the inability of governments to respond to citizen demands and the erosion of political support (Sartori 1997)

Impeachment : A constitutional control mechanism that allows the removal of a president through political trial (Levitsky, S, & Ziblatt, D, 2018)

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The Impeachment in Peru

Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Congress of the Republic of Peru. (2025). Minutes of presidential vacancy and resignation (2000–2025) .

Peru has become an emblematic case of presidential instability in Latin America. Since the political crisis of 2000, which culminated in the resignation of Alberto Fujimori following the release of the so-called “Vladivideos” and serious allegations of corruption and human rights violations, the country entered a cycle of irregular successions that ultimately undermined the stability of its democratic regime. Fujimori's fall marked a period of precariousness for the party system and widespread public distrust of institutions (Tanaka, 2005, p. 87).

The concept of removal from office due to “permanent moral incapacity” has historical roots in the Peruvian legal system dating back to 1839 and remains in effect under the 1993 Constitution (Political Constitution of Peru, 1993, Art. 113). However, its interpretation has varied over time. Initially, it was associated with the mental incapacity of the ruler, while currently it is understood as a subjective assessment of the ethical suitability and conduct of the head of state, which opens a wide margin of political discretion in its application.

This effect is observed in the data on citizen trust in political parties in Peru between 2000 and 2023. Although there are isolated peaks of recovery, the general trend is clearly downward, with levels falling below 15% at several key moments (2019–2020).

Source: Own elaboration, data taken from Latinobarometer (2024).

Following the fall of Alberto Fujimori (2000) , political trust plummeted to record lows (14%), reflecting the collapse of the party system and public revulsion towards the corruption of the Fujimori regime. This period marked the beginning of a “partyless” democracy, in which political representation lost its connection with the citizenry (Tanaka, M., 2005).

The interim government of Valentín Paniagua (2000–2001) brought about a slight recovery thanks to its conciliatory approach, but the rise of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) and his corruption scandals reversed the downward trend. Confidence continued to deteriorate during the presidencies of Alan García (2006–2011) and Ollanta Humala (2011–2016) , who, although they completed their terms, were marked by social conflicts and ethical questions.

The most critical stage intensified from 2016 onward. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, elected that year, resigned in 2018 amid corruption allegations linked to the Odebrecht case and facing imminent parliamentary vacancy. This episode reflected the Executive's inability to maintain coalitions in the face of a fragmented and hostile Congress, which precipitated his departure (Meléndez, 2019, p. 22). Subsequently, the impeachment of Martín Vizcarra (2020) demonstrated the incapacity of both the Executive and the Legislative branches to maintain even minimal agreements. This situation reflected a breakdown of institutional legitimacy, in which Congress assumed a hegemonic role in defining political power (Durand, 2023, p. 147).

The brief government of Manuel Merino (2020) represented one of the most critical moments: the repression of protests and the deaths of demonstrators led to a near-total collapse of public trust (BBC, 2020). The subsequent transitional government of Francisco Sagasti (2020–2021) allowed for some stabilization, although without substantial improvements in the perception of the political parties. In the following years, the terms of Pedro Castillo (2021–2022) and Dina Boluarte (2022–2025) failed to reverse this trend.

Taken together, the graph shows that every presidential rupture—whether due to vacancy, resignation, or protests—has an immediate and negative impact on public trust. In turn, this distrust fuels new crises of legitimacy, creating a vicious cycle of fragile governance. The result is a democracy that survives more through institutional inertia than through citizen conviction.

Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Congress of the Republic of Peru (2025)

The bar chart shows the distribution of how Peruvian presidents left office between 2000 and 2025, revealing a pattern of chronic political instability. According to data from the Peruvian Congress, three presidents completed their terms, three resigned, three were removed from office through impeachment, and two served as interim presidents.

This trend demonstrates that, in the last two decades, only a minority of presidents have completed their constitutional term regularly, while the majority have been replaced by political crises or forced resignations. The fact that the figures for "vacancy" and resignation are equal shows that political pressure and loss of legitimacy have become structural factors in Peruvian governance.

In summary, since 2000, the country has had eleven presidents, when constitutionally it should have only had five full terms. On average, each president has remained in power for 2.3 years, demonstrating a marked lack of governmental continuity.

This cycle of resignations, vacancies, and interim governments reveals that Peruvian democracy operates in a scenario of structural fragility and crisis, where the balance between the Executive and Legislative branches is constantly strained, and where the figure of vacancy has become a recurring instrument of political resolution, rather than an exceptional measure.

Impeachment in Latin America

The Peruvian experience is far from “exceptional.” In various Latin American countries, impeachment has been incorporated into constitutions as a mechanism of democratic control against presidents who lose social legitimacy or commit serious offenses. However, the scope, causes, and limits of this procedure vary critically.

In Brazil, the 1988 Constitution regulates the presidential impeachment process in Articles 85 and 86, establishing that the president can be removed for “crimes of responsibility.” This legal provision was key to Dilma Rousseff’s removal in 2016, in a process linked to budgetary manipulation and a deep political crisis (Rattinger, 2018).

In Paraguay, the 1992 Constitution establishes impeachment as a mechanism to remove the president for reasons such as serious misconduct or official misconduct (Articles 225 and 229). The case of Fernando Lugo in June 2012 was emblematic: the Paraguayan Congress approved his removal in a very accelerated process that was widely criticized by international organizations for weakening democratic legitimacy (Marsteintredet, Llanos & Nolte, 2013).

In Honduras, the 2009 political crisis led Congress and the Supreme Court to endorse the removal of Manuel Zelaya, which many analysts described as a breakdown of the institutional order, despite the existence of rules controlling the Executive branch. This situation highlighted the tension between formal accountability mechanisms and extraordinary measures in presidential governance (Pérez-Liñán, 2007).

In Ecuador, the 2008 Constitution incorporates specific grounds for presidential removal through impeachment. In 2023, President Guillermo Lasso faced this mechanism, opting to invoke the “mutual dissolution” (dissolution of Congress) to avoid his removal, which demonstrated how constitutional control can take complex forms in crisis contexts (García-Marín, 2025).

In Colombia, by comparison, the 1991 Political Constitution defines a much more restrictive and predictable framework for presidential accountability. Article 174 establishes that the president can only be impeached by the Senate in cases of “violation of the Constitution or the law,” and always based on a prior judicial procedure by the Supreme Court of Justice (Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991, art. 174). This design fosters institutional certainty, as it limits impeachment to verifiable legal grounds, unlike the ambiguity of the Peruvian case.

These cases show that, while in countries like Brazil and Paraguay impeachment is limited to crimes of responsibility or to specific causes, in Peru the open clause of moral incapacity has given rise to broad and discretionary interpretations, with a greater frequency of application.

Source: Prepared by the author using data from Sánchez Gayosso, RD, & Escamilla Cadena, A. (2017). The interruption of the presidential term in Latin America (1992–2016) & BBC News (2020, 2025)

The final graph shows that Peru stands out for having the highest number of episodes, suggesting that presidential vacancy has become a systematic mechanism for resolving political crises. This recurring use reflects the combination of a fragmented party system, a Congress with broad powers, and low executive legitimacy—elements that, together, generate cycles of instability.

In contrast, countries like Ecuador, Brazil, and Paraguay have resorted to impeachment less frequently, employing it only as an extraordinary measure in critical situations. Presidential stability in Latin America is directly related to the quality of institutions. The recurrence of impeachments in certain countries demonstrates that, beyond specific circumstances, there are structural patterns of fragile governance, in which Congress plays a central role in determining the continuity or interruption of presidential terms.

Recommendations

• Strengthening democratic legitimacy: As Sartori (1997) argues, a stable democracy depends on the capacity of its institutions to prevent crises before they occur. In the Peruvian case, this implies rethinking the relationship between Congress and the Presidency under a logic of preventive constitutional engineering; that is, measuring the effects of reforms and ensuring that control mechanisms—such as impeachment or political trials—are used with legal and not partisan criteria.

• Opening spaces for preventive dialogue: To reduce constant confrontation between branches of government, spaces for political dialogue should be promoted as preventative mechanisms. The creation of joint commissions or roundtables between the Executive, the Legislative, and civil society can serve as a channel for early understanding, preventing political conflicts from escalating into institutional crises. Timely dialogue strengthens governance and public trust.

• Defining the scope of impeachment: In line with Sartori's reflections (1997), impeachment should be conceived as an exceptional measure and not as a tool for partisan pressure. This process must have objective parameters that distinguish between ethical, legal, and political responsibility, guaranteeing a genuine balance of power. Reforming its scope would allow removal from office to once again be an exceptional measure aimed at protecting democratic stability, and not a tool for confrontation against the government.

Conclusion

First, in the short term, presidential vacancy in Peru will remain a sensitive issue on the political agenda. As long as Article 113 of the Constitution remains unamended, Congress will continue to have considerable leeway to interpret “permanent moral incapacity” according to its immediate interests. This could generate renewed tensions between the Legislative and Executive branches, especially if the public maintains its distrust of political parties and democratic institutions. Furthermore, the country is likely to undergo a period of political reconfiguration, in which new actors emerge with anti-parliamentary or “democratic refounding” rhetoric. These movements could channel social discontent and gain ground in Congress, though not necessarily strengthen institutions. In this context, polarization could remain a dominant feature of Peruvian politics.

Secondly, in the medium term, the stability of the regime will depend on the ability of political forces to reach a minimum consensus. If a constitutional reform is promoted that clarifies the grounds for impeachment, the system could regain balance and predictability. Sustained dialogue between Congress, the Executive, and civil society would be key to reducing the political manipulation of moral judgments and restoring public trust.

Ultimately, in the long term, the Peruvian case could become an opportunity to rethink presidentialism in Latin America. If countries manage to design clearer institutions with effective checks and balances and well-defined control mechanisms, they could prevent impeachment processes from becoming a political norm. Otherwise, the region will remain trapped in cycles of crisis, in which democratic legitimacy is measured by the length of time governments last, not by their capacity to govern.

References

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BBC News, (November 13, 2020). Manuel Merino resigns: what's behind the massive protests that culminated in the president's resignation https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-54924923

BBCNews. (2025, October 10). Peru: President Dina Boluarte removed amid rising crime . https://www.bbc.com/news/world-americas-

Congress of the Republic of Peru. (October 10, 2025). Due to permanent moral incapacity: Congress of the Republic approves the removal of Dina Boluarte with 122 votes in favor . Congress News Center. https://www.congreso.gob.pe

Congress of the Republic of Peru. (2025). Minutes of presidential vacancy and resignation (2000–2025) . Lima: Congress of the Republic of Peru.

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