Crime and polarization: The lethal threat to democracy in Latin America

Introduction

In the last decade, Latin America has faced a significant increase in political violence that threatens the stability of its democracies through assassinations and attacks against political figures, especially in contexts of high polarization and the influence of organized crime. Countries like Mexico and Colombia have registered alarming patterns of lethal political violence, particularly during election periods. According to Infobae (2025), in Mexico, during the first six months of 2025, 253 incidents related to political violence were documented in 29 of the 32 states, including 112 homicides of political actors. According to the BBC (2023), in Ecuador, presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated on August 9, 2023, just eleven days before the general elections, in an attack carried out after a rally in Quito. On the other hand, in Argentina, on September 1, 2022, a man pointed a loaded gun at the head of Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who survived only because the weapon did not fire.

These cases, among others, reveal a common pattern: when ideological polarization prevails and organized crime has territorial control or access to state networks, political violence intensifies. This phenomenon not only undermines the personal safety of political actors but also erodes public trust in democratic institutions. The constant threat, and in many cases the actual occurrence, of assassinations has an intimidating effect on candidates, can distort free electoral competition, and weaken the credibility of the vote.

This Policy Brief examines the underlying patterns of political violence, identifying how the intersection of partisan polarization and territorial/criminal control of certain regions has eroded democratic trust. It will focus on the upcoming 2026 elections in Colombia and the upcoming local elections in Mexico and Ecuador as critical moments where violence could decisively influence the results and legitimacy of the process. Finally, it will explore recommendations for implementing multilateral frameworks, such as OAS protocols, regional intelligence mechanisms, and counternarcotics cooperation, to mitigate risks and strengthen electoral resilience in the region.

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Concepts

Political violence: The concept of political violence refers to all those acts of violence that, by their origin, their objectives or the consequences they produce, are related to political power (Waldmann, 1992).

Lethal political violence: This refers to the form of political violence that involves acts that result in the death of the victims, distinguishing it from other non-lethal forms (García, M & Holmes, D. 2020)

Organized crime: "Organized crime is defined as a structured group of three or more persons, existing over time and acting in concert with the aim of committing serious crimes or crimes which, taken together, generate a significant profit, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, an economic or other benefit." (United Nations against Transnational Organized Crime. 2000).

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Organized crime, polarization, and the ballot box

Source: Prepared by the author using data collected from Datacívica, MOE and France24.

The figures from Colombia and Mexico reveal distinct but overlapping patterns in the concentration of lethal political violence at the local level. In Colombia, although institutional assassinations are practically nonexistent, the murders of local politicians show recurring spikes, with increases in 2019-2020 and a critical surge in 2023-2024, when more than 200 cases were recorded. This demonstrates a cyclical nature linked to electoral periods and the territorial control of organized crime. In Mexico, meanwhile, the escalation is even more pronounced: after maintaining relatively stable averages below 100 cases until 2020, violence skyrocketed from 2021 onwards, exceeding 270 murders in 2022 and reaching a peak of 351 in 2023-2024, with 199 so far in 2025. Taken together, both experiences confirm how local political violence has become an instrument of organized crime and polarization to influence electoral competition and erode democratic stability in the region.

In Mexico and Colombia, lethal political violence has shown a direct correlation with electoral cycles, revealing how organized crime and partisan polarization erode institutional security. The graphs show that election years see the highest peaks in assassinations of political figures, especially those holding local offices, where territorial disputes are most intense. The graph for Mexico shows that between 2015 and 2025, the country registered more than 1,700 assassinations of political figures, with pronounced peaks in the election years of 2018, 2021, and 2024. In 2021, for example, more than 75 homicides were documented, while in 2024 the figure approached 346 cases, concentrated in states such as Guerrero, Veracruz, Michoacán, and Oaxaca. This systematic pattern reveals that political violence, although it reaches higher levels during election periods, remains structurally present and responds to a logic of territorial capture by organized crime. During the first six months of 2025, 253 incidents of political violence were recorded, including 199 homicides of political figures in 29 of the 32 federal entities. As reported by Infobae (2025), “political violence in Mexico has become a constant in every electoral process, with candidates assassinated during campaigns and officials killed by armed groups.” Most of the victims held municipal positions or were mayoral candidates, reinforcing the hypothesis that organized crime seeks to control local governments as a gateway to institutional power. According to Integralia Consultores (2025), “political violence in Mexico is not circumstantial, but rather part of a territorial control strategy by criminal groups that see municipal governments as an opportunity to consolidate their influence.”

The graph for Colombia reveals a different pattern. Although the country does not exhibit the same systematic pattern as Mexico, it does show an intensification of political violence in election years, especially in 2018 and 2022. In those years, significant increases were recorded in the assassinations of political leaders, with an emphasis on legislative and local positions. The graph indicates that, in 2022, a presidential and legislative election year, more than 104 assassinations of political actors were documented, many of them linked to emerging parties or social movements. Unlike Mexico, where organized crime dominates, in Colombia, violence is more closely linked to ideological polarization and party fragmentation. Violence against political figures has ceased to be marginal and has become a structural risk to Colombian democracy, especially in areas where the State lacks an effective presence. The departments with the highest incidence are Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, and Norte de Santander, all with histories of armed conflict and territorial disputes. Furthermore, political polarization has generated a climate of hostility toward candidates representing moderate or institutional positions. In 2025, although the electoral cycle has not yet fully taken hold, initial data show a surge in threats and attacks against pre-candidates, especially in Congress and in strategic mayoral races. This pattern suggests that political violence in Colombia is evolving toward more sophisticated forms of electoral intimidation, where the objective is not only to eliminate the opponent but also to delegitimize the democratic process.

Thus, the comparative analysis between Mexico and Colombia confirms that lethal political violence intensifies in electoral contexts, albeit with different dynamics. In Mexico, organized crime uses violence as a tool for territorial control, primarily affecting local political actors. In Colombia, partisan polarization and institutional weakness create a risky environment for political figures in contested areas. Both cases illustrate how the intersection of crime and polarization not only threatens the safety of candidates but also distorts electoral competition and weakens democratic legitimacy.

The assassinations of powerful figures as critical ruptures in Latin American democracy

Source: Prepared by the author using data collected from BBC, France24 and El Tiempo.

The figures on political assassinations in the last decade show that, although less frequent than the murders of local figures, these events have a disproportionate impact on democratic stability. The first graph shows that the most significant cases are concentrated between 2021 and 2025: Haiti (2021), Argentina (2022), Ecuador (2023), and Colombia (2025). This pattern reveals that political assassinations are no longer isolated incidents, but rather a regional manifestation of political violence. The table complements this overview by detailing the profile of the victims and the context in which they occurred. It shows that most of the assassinations took place during critical electoral periods: presidential campaigns (Ecuador and Haiti), local pre-campaigns (Ecuador), or periods of political polarization (Argentina and Colombia). Furthermore, the perpetrators are linked both to organized crime—as in Ecuador—and to dynamics of extreme polarization, as in Argentina and Colombia. Taken together, the data confirm that assassinations become exceptional but decisive ruptures, capable of destabilizing governments and eroding institutional legitimacy in the region.

Source: Prepared by the author using data collected from BBC, France24 and El Tiempo.

Unlike the systematic violence that affects local political actors, assassinations of high-ranking officials constitute exceptional ruptures in the democratic order. Their impact is not only symbolic but also structural, as they destabilize governments, disrupt electoral processes, and expose the fragility of institutions in the face of organized crime and polarization. The cases recorded between 2021 and 2025 in Haiti, Argentina, Ecuador, and Colombia demonstrate that this extreme form of political violence has become regionalized, targeting high-profile figures in crisis contexts.

In Ecuador, the assassination of Fernando Villavicencio marked a turning point. On August 9, 2023, eleven days before the general elections, the presidential candidate was murdered after a rally in Quito. According to Primicias (2023), “Villavicencio was executed by hitmen linked to drug trafficking, after publicly denouncing criminal networks within the state apparatus.” This assassination altered the course of the campaign, reshaped alliances, and exposed the vulnerability of the Ecuadorian electoral system to organized crime.

In Colombia this year, the assassination of Senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay during the pre-campaign period also marks a democratic turning point. According to CNN (2025), it constitutes the first institutional assassination of a high-ranking official in more than a decade. Uribe Turbay's death marks a breaking point in Colombian politics, where violence has escalated from the social sphere to the institutional level. This crime occurred within a context of extreme polarization, hate speech, and party fragmentation, which intensified the crisis of political legitimacy.

The Haitian case, for its part, reflects an even more serious pattern. On July 7, 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated at his residence by foreign mercenaries. As France24 (2023) highlighted, this was “a transnational assassination that demonstrated the criminal capture of the Haitian state and its institutional collapse.” This event plunged the country into a prolonged crisis of governance, with multiple factions vying for power and no clear elections on the horizon.

In Argentina, political violence reached a climax with the attempted assassination of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner on September 1, 2022. During the attack, a man pointed a loaded gun inches from her face, in an event that The Guardian (2022) described as “the most serious episode of political violence since the return to democracy.” Although the attack failed, it demonstrated how polarization and the politicization of the judiciary have eroded institutional stability.

Taken together, these episodes are not isolated incidents, but rather part of an emerging pattern in Latin America in which political assassinations become the extreme expression of institutionalized political violence. Beyond their impact on governmental stability, these crimes directly undermine public trust in democracy. According to the Latinobarometer (2023), countries where recent assassinations have occurred exhibit critical levels of distrust: in Haiti, only 17% of the population expresses support for democracy; in Ecuador, support falls to 38%, while in Colombia it barely reaches 48%, and in Argentina it stands at 41%. This correlation between lethal violence against political figures and low democratic trust suggests that assassinations not only create power vacuums but also erode the legitimacy of the representative system. The graphs show how these events are concentrated between 2021 and 2025 in countries with high levels of polarization or criminal infiltration. In response, urgent multilateral measures are needed, including electoral protection protocols, regional intelligence cooperation, and early warning mechanisms to prevent the recurrence of these events.

Regionalization of political violence and lack of cooperation

Extreme political violence, such as assassinations of political figures, can no longer be considered a purely national phenomenon. In Latin America and the Caribbean, a pattern is emerging that transcends borders: organized crime with transnational networks, polarizing rhetoric that reinforces itself across countries, and governments with fragile institutions. This phenomenon demands a coordinated response that goes beyond the capabilities of isolated states.

One sign that the region is beginning to recognize the need for institutional cooperation is the creation of the Alliance for Security, Justice and Development, promoted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). On December 12, 2024, eighteen countries in Latin America and the Caribbean signed the Barbados Declaration, formalizing this alliance, which seeks to combat organized crime through three pillars: protecting vulnerable populations, strengthening security and justice institutions, and reducing illicit financial markets. Furthermore, cooperation is expanding to include technical components. In April 2025, INTERPOL and the IDB signed a letter of intent to “identify areas for cooperation in the fight against organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean,” strengthening the operational dimension of the regional effort. Additionally, the EL PAcCTO 2.0 initiative, launched in March 2024 with European funding, aims to strengthen the justice, security, and technical capacity of Latin American and Caribbean countries to address transnational crime.

However, despite these advances, existing mechanisms still do not respond with the necessary speed or coverage to the risk profile posed by political assassinations. There is still no specific regional early warning system for threatened candidates, nor are there multilateral protocols to protect political campaigns during critical moments. Furthermore, there is a fragmentation of resources and political will to ensure preventive protection; in many cases, actions are only activated after the damage has occurred, not before. Consequently, these developments demonstrate two complementary facts: first, that extreme political violence has acquired a transnational dimension, in which the dangers to democracy share causes, actors, and effects across countries; and second, that the regional institutional response is present but incomplete, reactive, and inconsistent. Given this scenario, it is imperative to establish binding mechanisms that include common electoral protection protocols, transnational political intelligence networks, effective judicial cooperation, and a regional early warning system to safeguard democratic integrity against institutionalized violence.

Recommendations

• Adopt OAS protocols to protect candidates: Implement early warning systems and electoral security measures, prioritizing women and vulnerable groups, to reduce political violence and strengthen inclusive democracy.

• Strengthen regional cooperation against crime: Expand transnational intelligence networks, such as EL PAcCTO 2.0, to dismantle organized crime, protecting women politicians and ensuring parity in representation.

• Promote gender parity and combat symbolic violence: Establish 50/50 equal quotas and protocols against discourses that limit women, guaranteeing their substantive participation in the public agenda.

Conclusion

Political violence in Latin America has experienced an alarming increase in the last decade, manifesting itself in assassinations, attacks, and murders of political actors that undermine democratic stability, particularly in contexts of ideological polarization and the infiltration of organized crime. Countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, and Argentina illustrate how this violence not only threatens personal security but also distorts electoral processes and erodes trust in institutions. Given this scenario, two prospective scenarios are proposed:

In a positive medium- and long-term scenario, if states implement robust multilateral frameworks such as OAS protocols for electoral protection, regional mechanisms for shared intelligence, and intensified cooperation against drug trafficking and transnational crime, the risks of political violence can be effectively mitigated, the resilience of electoral systems strengthened, and an inclusive democracy guaranteed. This would allow for the substantive participation of all political actors, including women and marginalized groups, by promoting safe environments that facilitate their influence on the public agenda and reduce criminal influence on institutions.

In a negative scenario, if these recommendations are not adopted, the dynamics of polarization and territorial control by organized crime could be reinforced, perpetuating discourses and attitudes that normalize political violence—including symbolic and lethal forms that particularly limit women in public office. This would relegate democracy to a mere formality of electoral processes, discouraging diverse participation and generating a merely apparent legitimacy, without considering the voices of vulnerable sectors or advancing toward stable governance in the region.

References

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